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Footnotes
1. City of Garden Grove v. Super. Ct. of Orange Co., 157 Cal. App.
4th 355 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2007).
2. “Diversion” of medical marijuana, as hereafter used, means any
nonmedical purpose or use but especially distribution, sharing,
resale, and recreational use.
3. Further references to “patient” or “caregiver” means a “qualified
patient” and “primary caregiver,” respectively, within the mean-
ing of California’s medical marijuana laws.  Cal. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 11362.7(d), (f) (Lexis 2008).
4. While this article considers medical marijuana laws in general, it
surveys California law in particular.
5. As will be discussed, persons possessing quantities above the
general quantity guideline limits are likely not in compliance
with medical marijuana laws and are subject to criminal prose-
cution; thus, the presumption need not apply to them because
their conduct is already unlawful.
6. NORML, Working to Reform Marijuana Laws,
http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=3391 (updated Dec.
01, 2004).
7. Maryland merely limits penalties to a $100 fine after a successful
defense of medical need.  Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 5-
601(c)(3)(ii) (Lexis 2008).
8. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.320(1)(a) (Lexis 2007).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 26-2B-3(A) (Lexis 2008); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 69.51A.040(3)(b) (Lexis 2008).
10. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.77(a) (Lexis 2008).
In November 2007, a California Court of Appeal issued a
decision in Garden Grove v. Superior Court1 that requires local
police officers to return medical marijuana to a qualified
patient, despite a lawful search and seizure subsequent to a
moving motor vehicle violation.  The effect of this ruling, in at
least some instances, will be to place marijuana back into the
hands of a person who is a risk to public safety while driving
under the influence or is engaged in the “diversion”2 of med-
ical marijuana through unlawful transporting.
A qualified patient is authorized to possess and use medical
marijuana that adheres to certain general quantity guidelines.
While adhering to the general quantity guideline limits for
which possession is allowed by law, a person could transport
marijuana for his or her use and thereafter drive under the
influence or, alternatively, could unlawfully divert medical
marijuana for nonmedical purposes.  States have the right to
exercise their police powers for the benefit of public health,
safety, and welfare.  This article proposes a presumption limit-
ing a qualified patient or primary caregiver’s3 right to transport
medical marijuana within a motor vehicle to protect against
driving under the influence, reduce unlawful diversions, and
ensure compliance with medical marijuana laws.4 This pre-
sumption, under certain circumstances, allows for a forfeiture
of medical marijuana that is presumably possessed for non-
medical purposes.
In addressing the Garden Grove decision, this article relies
upon public safety and public policy to justify the forfeiture
and destruction of medical marijuana following lawful seizure
from a motor vehicle.  This presumption, while making an
exception for the initial procurement of medical marijuana,
presumes that a patient or caregiver who has direct and imme-
diate control of a motor vehicle is transporting the medical
marijuana for nonmedical use.  Notably, the presumption
would only apply to persons whose possession adheres to the
general quantity guideline limits.5
The rationale for the presumption is that there is no reason
that a patient or caregiver should be driving while transporting
marijuana, with the exception of same-day procurement, and
thus, the impermissible transporting of medical marijuana
should result in forfeiture.  This, in turn, prevents the mari-
juana from being returned to the patient or caregiver and acts
as a deterrent to transporting marijuana for nonmedical pur-
poses or in situations that can adversely affect public safety.
I. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL 
MARIJUANA LAWS
A. LIMITATIONS ON AMOUNTS FOR POSSESSION 
AND USE
Currently, there are 13 states with laws related to medical
marijuana:  Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine,
Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington.6 The allowable limit of
marijuana that may be legally possessed spans from none in
Maryland7 to 24 ounces in Oregon,8 with Washington and New
Mexico allowing a 60-day and 90-day supply,9 respectively, as
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11. Id. § 11362.77(b).
12. Id. § 11362.5(d); People v. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th 457, 474 (2002)
(concluding that section 11362.5(d) grants a “defendant a lim-
ited immunity from prosecution . . . .”).
13. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.71(a)(1) (Lexis 2007).
14. Id. § 11362.71(e).
15. Id. § 11362.77(b); People v. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th 81, 97 (2006)
(recognizing medical needs exceeding the general eight ounce
quantity limit will afford a Compassionate Use Act affirmative
defense).
16. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.71(f) (Lexis 2007).
17. Id. § 11362.5(b)(2).
18. Id. § 11362.79(d).
19. Id. § 11362.5(b)(2).
20. Id. § 11473.5(a).
21. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 4474b(d) (Lexis 2007).
22. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
23. People v. Strasburg, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1059 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist. 2007).
24. Id. at 1055.
25. Id. at 1055-1056. 
26. Id at 1058.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1060.
determined by the state health department.  Most states allow
possession of between one to eight ounces of marijuana.
California permits a qualified patient or primary caregiver to
possess up to eight ounces under general quantity guidelines,10
but they may possess a greater quantity, upon physician’s rec-
ommendation, if their medical needs so require.11
B. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND PROTECTION
GENERALLY
While states generally afford legal protections to qualified
patients and their primary caregiver, the means by which these
protections are invoked varies.  Nearly every state allows the
use of its statutes to be employed as an affirmative defense
against prosecution.12 Most states have mandatory registration
and identification programs, though participation is voluntary
in California.13 Many states, including California, allow pro-
tection from arrest and prosecution for qualified patients and
primary caregivers who are registered cardholders in compli-
ance with state law requirements.14 When the qualified patient
or primary caregiver is neither a registered cardholder nor in
full compliance, as for example when his or her possession
exceeds the general quantity limit, the qualified patient or pri-
mary caregiver may invoke the statutory protections by way of
an affirmative defense.15 This is true in California since the
qualified patient or primary caregiver need not be registered to
avail themselves of the afforded protections.16
C. EXCEPTIONS FOR ENDANGERING OTHERS
AND/OR USE WHILE IN A MOTOR VEHICLE
Though medical marijuana laws (“MMLs”) vary in the
degree of protection they afford to qualified patients and pri-
mary caregivers, most states provide exceptions to the protec-
tions granted by their MMLs.  These laws prohibit qualified
patients and primary caregivers from “engaging in conduct
that endangers others”17 and/or prohibit the use of marijuana
while in an operated motor vehicle.18 California also precludes
protection for conduct that diverts marijuana for nonmedical
uses.19
D. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND REQUIRED RETURNS OF
MARIJUANA FOLLOWING SEIZURE
States also differ in their treatment of seized marijuana
and/or paraphernalia following a situation where prosecution
was not initiated or was dismissed because the possession was
deemed non-criminal.  Most MMLs protect marijuana and
paraphernalia as property
that must be returned to a
qualified patient or primary
caregiver who is in lawful
possession.  Some states,
such as California, did not
enact such a provision as part
of its MMLs and look to other
statutes20 and decisional law
for clarification of the issue.
Notably, Vermont is sui
generis in specifying that,
under its medical marijuana
laws, law-enforcement officers are expressly not required to
return marijuana or paraphernalia following a seizure.21
II. EFFECT OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS ON VEHI-
CLE SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND ARRESTS
A. MOTOR VEHICLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
Generally, “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred.”22 In addition, probable cause will per-
mit a warrantless search of an automobile with the scope of the
search extending to “every part of the vehicle and its contents”
that might contain the items actually sought.23
B. EFFECT OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS ON
VEHICLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
California courts have explained the effect of California’s
Compassionate Use Act (“CUA”) upon law-enforcement inves-
tigations.  In People v. Strasburg, a police officer encountered
Strasburg parked in his car immediately after he had smoked
marijuana.24 Strasburg notified the officer of his status as a
qualified patient and produced his prescription.25 The issue
was whether the officer had probable cause to search Strasburg’s
car and, consequentially, whether detaining and frisking him
was lawful since he was a qualified patient under the CUA.26
The court held the CUA “does not impair reasonable police
investigations and searches.”27 The court stated the CUA pro-
vides limited immunity, as opposed to a shield from investiga-
tion, and held that the officer was entitled to search and inves-
tigate to determine if Strasburg was acting lawfully because
probable cause existed after the officer smelled the marijuana.28
Strasburg’s conviction was upheld because he possessed 23
[M]edical 
marijuana laws
("MMLs") vary in
the degree of 
protection they
afford to qualified
patients and 
primary 
caregivers . . . .
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29. Id. 
30. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5(a) (Lexis 2008).
31. People v. Urziceanu, 132 Cal. App. 4th 747, 783 (Cal. App. 3rd
Dist. 2005).
32. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th at 84.
33. Id. at 93.
34. Id. 
35. Mower, 28 Cal. 4th at 469.
36. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.71(e) (Lexis 2007).
37. 42 Cal. 4th 920 (2008).
38. Id. at 924.
39. Id. at 925.
40.   Id. at 924.
41. Id. at 928.
42. Id. 
43. The California legislature has recently passed a bill to overturn
the decision handed down by the California Supreme Court in
Ross.  On February 21, 2008, Assembly Member Leno introduced
Assembly Bill 2279, which has successfully passed both houses
as of August 29, 2008.  The proposed law permits an employee
or prospective employee to assert a cause of action against an
employer who discriminates against him or her on the basis of
the employee’s status as a qualified patient or for taking adverse
action after the employee fails a drug test.  However, the pro-
posed law is inapplicable to those employed in a “safety-sensitive
position” and does not preclude the employer from taking
adverse action against an employee who is impaired at work or
during work hours.  Legis. Counsel of Cal., Bill Information,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html; search “AB 2279”, select
“Enrolled” bill in HTML or PDF (accessed Sept. 28, 2008).
44. Ross, 42 Cal. 4th at 928-929.
45. 40 Cal. 4th at 90-92.
46. 56 Cal. App. 4th 1532 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1997).
47. 92 Cal. App. 4th 229 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 2001).
48. Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 1536.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1547.
ounces of marijuana.29
While voters approved the
CUA in 1996,30 the Medical
Marijuana Program Act
(“MMPA”) was enacted in
2003 to “address additional
issues that were not included
within the [CUA] and that
[needed to be resolved to pro-
mote its] fair and orderly
implementation . . . .”31 While
the CUA only applied to pos-
session and cultivation,32 the
MMPA extended patient and
caregiver protections to the acts of transporting, maintaining
or allowing a place to be used for marijuana related activity,
and nuisance.33 The MMPA affords immunity from arrest and
prosecution,34 as discussed above, to a qualified patient or pri-
mary caregiver who is registered, has an identification card,
and is in compliance.  The Supreme Court of California, in dis-
cussing the CUA as an affirmative defense, said that “immunity
from arrest is exceptional and, when granted . . .  is granted
expressly.”35 Such is the case for a registered patient or care-
giver with an identification card, but only if such persons com-
ply with MML provisions.36
III. THE GARDEN GROVE DECISION WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF CALIFORNIA’S MEDICAL MARI-
JUANA LAWS
A. PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS OF
CALIFORNIA’S MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS
The Supreme Court of California specifically addressed the
purpose and scope of the CUA in Ross v. RagingWire Telecomm.,
Inc.37 In Ross, the plaintiff, a qualified medical marijuana user,
sued his employer after being terminated for failing a pre-
employment drug test.38 Ross asserted his employer needed to
afford him a reasonable accommodation and his termination
was wrongful as against public policy.39 The court held Ross
could not state a valid disability discrimination claim or
wrongful termination claim.40 The court reasoned that CUA
was not intended to alter employment relationships.41 Rather,
the CUA’s purpose is to provide seriously ill Californians with
the right to obtain and use physician-recommended marijuana
for medical purposes while ensuring that qualified users and
their primary caregivers are not subject to criminal prosecu-
tion or criminal sanction.42 The employee’s termination was
upheld since the CUA speaks exclusively to the criminal law.43
Finally, in addition to purpose and scope, the Ross court
also addressed the CUA’s limitations.  In particular, the court
explicitly rejected the assertion that the CUA created a broad
right to use marijuana without hindrance or inconvenience,
since the measure did not purport to change the laws affecting
public intoxication, nor did the CUA “supersede legislation
prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that endangers
others,” the latter being expressly codified.44
B. MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS AS A DEFENSE TO
CRIMINAL TRANSPORTATION
Given the manner in which the CUA and MMPA were
enacted, there has been some inconsistency with respect to
whether California’s MMLs provide a defense to a criminal
charge of transporting marijuana.  The Supreme Court of
California, in People v. Wright,45 addressed the issue of trans-
porting under California’s MMLs, noting a conflict between the
appellate court decisions in People v. Trippet46 and People v.
Young.47
In Trippet, the court recognized that the CUA might
impliedly afford a defense to transporting marijuana.48 In that
case, the defendant’s vehicle was stopped for not having a
license plate lamp light.49 Upon smelling marijuana, the police
officer searched the car and confiscated approximately two
pounds.50 Trippet was charged with both transporting and
possession.51 The Trippet court held that although the CUA
did not expressly provide a defense to transporting, it might
impliedly provide such a defense in some situations depending
upon the quantity transported and the method, timing, and
distance of the transportation to determine whether the trans-
In Trippett, the
court recognized
that the
[Compassionate
Use Act] might
impliedly afford 
a defense to 
transporting 
marijuana.
52. Id. at 1550-1551.
53. Id. at 1536.
54. Young, 92 Cal. App. 4th at 231.
55. Id. at 232.
56. Id.
57.   Id.
58. Id. at 237. 
59. Id. at 238.
60. Wright, 40 Cal. 4th at 85-86.
61. Id. at 86.
62. Id. at 87.
63. Id. at 87-89.
64. Id. at 90.
65. Id. at 92.
66. Id. at 98.
67. Id. at 98-99.
68. Id. at 100-101 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
69. Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 362.
70. Id. at 363.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 364.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 380.
79. Id. at 373.
port reasonably related to the patient’s medical needs (here-
after the “Trippet test”).52 The case was remanded to determine
whether Trippet was a qualified patient and what amount of
marijuana was authorized by her physician.53
However, the Young court expressly rejected the CUA as
affording a defense to a charge of transporting.54 In Young, an
officer observed a car swerve on the highway.55 Upon investi-
gation, the officer asked Young if drugs were in the car.56
Young admitted the presence of marijuana, but provided a
physician’s statement authorizing use.57 The Young court held
the CUA does not provide a defense to transporting marijuana
as it unambiguously covers only possession and cultivation.58
Young’s conviction for transporting marijuana was affirmed.59
In Wright, the Supreme Court of California indirectly
endorsed the Trippet test with respect to transporting cases.
Defendant Wright was found to be in possession of several
bags of marijuana weighing just over a pound after officers
investigated a tip that his car smelled of marijuana.60 He was
charged with possession for sale, transporting, and driving on
a suspended license.61 Before trial, he pled guilty to the license
charge and, at trial, defended the remaining charges upon the
grounds that he was a qualified patient who preferred to ingest
marijuana rather than smoke it, which was why he asserted he
possessed greater than a pound.62 Wright was convicted of
possession for sale and transporting after the trial court refused
a CUA defense jury instruction.63 The issue was whether the
CUA provides a defense to a charge of transporting and
whether it was reversible error to refuse such an instruction.64
While acknowledging that the Trippet test continues to be a
useful analytical tool, the court held the transporting issue
related to the CUA was moot since the newly enacted MMPA
had extended protections to charges of transporting.65 The
court found that Wright would be entitled to a CUA defense,66
as expanded by the MMPA and under the facts of his case, but
his conviction was upheld.  Since the jury was given the option
of convicting him for the lesser included offense of possession,
it had resolved, albeit implicitly but necessarily, that Wright’s
conduct was not for personal medical use when it convicted
him for sales.67
In addition to addressing whether the CUA, as expanded by
the MMPA, afforded a defense to transporting, the court
addressed what must be proven for a defendant to invoke an
affirmative defense under the CUA.  In particular, the Wright
court noted that the defendant has the burden to produce evi-
dence that: 1) he is a quali-
fied patient; 2) the quantity
possessed was authorized
pursuant to a physician’s
recommendation; and 3)
the marijuana is for the
defendant’s own personal
medical use.68
C. THE GARDEN
GROVE DECISION
As mentioned above,
Garden Grove v. Superior
Court69 addressed the right
of a qualified patient to have marijuana returned to him or her
after it was lawfully seized subsequent to a valid traffic stop.  In
Garden Grove, defendant Kha was stopped for running a red
light.70 Kha consented to a vehicle search and officers recov-
ered a pipe and 8.1 grams of marijuana that Kha claimed he
obtained from a lab in Long Beach.71 Though Kha produced a
seemingly valid doctor’s referral, the police seized the mari-
juana and cited Kha for running the red light and unlawful
possession of less than an ounce of marijuana while driving.72
Kha subsequently “pled guilty to the traffic violation, but . . .
contested the drug charge.”73 After Kha’s doctor verified that
Kha was authorized to use marijuana for medical reasons, the
prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge, but opposed Kha’s
request to return the marijuana.74 The trial court ordered that
the marijuana be returned to Kha.75 The City of Garden Grove
(“the City”) filed a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition
“directing the trial court to vacate its order and enter a new one
denying Kha’s motion for a return of [the marijuana].”76 The
Attorney General of California defended the trial court’s order,
as amicus curiae.77
The issue before the Garden Grove court was whether police
may deny the return of marijuana that was lawfully seized dur-
ing a vehicle search because returning it would result in a vio-
lation of the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).78
The City asserted Kha was not entitled to the protections of
the CUA and MMPA because Kha 1) obtained his marijuana
illegally, 2) did not have a qualifying illness, and 3) was not
charged with a requisite offense covered under the CUA or
MMPA since he was cited for possessing marijuana while dri-
ving in violation of the Vehicle Code.79 The court rejected all
The issue before the
Garden Grove court
was whether policy
may deny the return
of marijuana . . .
because returning 
it would result in 
a violation of 
[federal law].
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80 Id. at 375-376.
81. Id. at 377-386.
82. Id. at 378-379.
83. Id. at 383.
84. Id. at 386.
85. Id. at 386-392.
86. Id. at 377-378.
87. Id. at 387-389.
88. Id. at 391.
89. Id. at 363.
90. Ross, 42 Cal. 4th at 929.
91. Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 23152(a) (Lexis 2008).
92. Id. § 23630.
93. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 510 (Alaska 1975).
of these arguments stating,
respectively, 1) the CUA and
MMPA afford protection
without regard to the source
of the marijuana, 2) mere
recommendation by a physi-
cian suffices for CUA and
MMPA protection, and 3) the
Vehicle Code statute pro-
hibiting the transporting of
marijuana was subject to a
CUA and MMPA defense
since it was merely an auto-
mobile-specific prohibition upon transporting marijuana.80
The court then addressed the issue of whether marijuana’s
illegality under federal law would permit the City to prevail on
its argument that state law, to the extent that it required the
return of the marijuana, was preempted by federal law.81 The
court acknowledged there was not any exception to criminal
possession of marijuana under federal law, but since state law
enforcement officials act pursuant to state law, they cannot use
federal laws as a mechanism of enforcement in state law pro-
ceedings.82 The court further noted that when Congress
enacted the federal CSA, it did not intend to occupy the entire
area of law that regulates marijuana or controlled substances,83
thus, the court held that federal supremacy principals of pre-
emption did not permit the City to withhold and not return the
marijuana.84
Finally, the court addressed due process considerations
related to returning the marijuana.85 California’s statute on the
destruction of property in the absence of a conviction essen-
tially provides that “seizures of controlled substances, instru-
ments, or paraphernalia. . . shall be destroyed by order of the
court, unless the court finds that [they] were lawfully pos-
sessed by the defendant.”86 Despite the fact that neither the
aforementioned law nor the MML provisions expressly provide
for the return of the marijuana at issue, the court found that,
because Kha was a qualified patient with physician authoriza-
tion to possess the amount seized under state law, due process
considerations of the Fourteenth Amendment required its
return.87 The court concluded by stating it was unable to dis-
cern any justification for the City or its police department to
withhold the marijuana and upheld the trial court’s order.88
Though the Garden Grove court did not explicitly apply the
three-prong test articulated in Wright, it implicitly found the
Wright test was satisfied because 1) Kha was a qualified patient
(first prong) with 2) physician authorization to possess the
amount seized (second prong), and 3) the marijuana was for
Kha’s personal medical use (third prong).89 As will be dis-
cussed, however, public policy concerns could justify perma-
nently withholding medical marijuana subsequent to a valid
traffic stop or vehicle investigation.
IV. PUBLIC SAFETY AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERA-
TIONS TO LIMIT TRANSPORTING AND THE RETURN
OF SEIZED MEDICAL MARIJUANA
Since the Garden Grove rule requires the return of lawfully
seized medical marijuana if the court finds that possession was
lawful, the prosecution must demonstrate possession was
unlawful to avoid operation of the Garden Grove rule.  With the
exception of initial procurement, a patient or caregiver who
transports marijuana in a motor vehicle should be closely scru-
tinized because such is potentially indicative of intent to use
marijuana and then operate a motor vehicle or engage in
unlawful diversion, both of which fall outside of MML protec-
tions.
A. PUBLIC SAFETY AS A LIMITATION UPON THE
TRANSPORTING OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
Both driving under the influence of marijuana and possess-
ing marijuana while driving are dangers to public safety.
1. Inherent Dangers to Public Safety Resulting
from Drugged Driving
California, like many other states with MMLs, has
expressly declared that the CUA does not supersede legis-
lation prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that
endangers others.90 California law prohibits driving under
the influence of alcohol and drugs,91 and as a matter of law
a person’s authorized use of alcohol or a drug does not
normally constitute a defense to a violation.92 As one
court noted,
one way in which use of marijuana most clearly
does affect the general public is in regard to its
effect on driving . . . .  [R]esearch has produced
increasing evidence of significant impairment of
the driving ability of persons under the influence
of cannabis.  Distortion of time perception, impair-
ment of psychomotor function, and increased
selectivity in attentiveness to surroundings appar-
ently can combine to lower driver ability.93
These attending risks to public safety are even more
problematic in instances where a patient’s medical need
for marijuana exceeds the general eight ounce limit
because such a need for larger than usual amounts of med-
ical marijuana necessarily means that heavier and/or more
The court 
concluded by 
stating it was
unable to discern
any justification 
for the City or its
police department
to withhold the
marijuana . . . .
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94. Hassan Khiabani et al., Relationship Between THC Concentration
in Blood and Impairment in Apprehended Drivers, Traffic Injury
Prevention (June 2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pubmed/16854704?ordinalpos=3&itool=EntrezSystem2
.PEnt (accessed Sept. 29, 2008).
95. M. Laloup et al., Correlation of Delta9-Tetrahydrocannabinol
Concentrations Determined by LC-MS-MS in Oral Fluid and Plasma
from Impaired Drivers and Evaluation of the On-Site Dräger
DrugTest, Forensic Science International (Sept. 2006), available
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16842950?ordinal-
pos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEnt (accessed Sept. 29, 2008)
(advising against roadside oral drug testing for marijuana due to
66% accuracy rate).
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available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14725950
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2008).
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Population Survey, Forensic Science International (Aug. 2007),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17628369
?ordinalpos=3&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEnt (accessed Sept. 29,
2008) (calling for greater legislative intervention due to the fre-
quency and common occurrence of DUIC).
98. People v. Rigo, 69 Cal. App. 4th 409, 414 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
1999).
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frequent use is required by
the patient.  This can
equate to a greater degree of
impairment, in the case of
heavier use, or a continu-
ous state of impairment, in
the case of more frequent
use.  Both of these situa-
tions lend themselves to
heightened public safety
risks when the medicated
patient undertakes to drive.
While it is certainly true
that not all qualified patients are driving under the influ-
ence, the Trippet and Strasburg cases demonstrate that
some qualified patients, if even but a minority, do in fact
smoke marijuana and then drive a motor vehicle.
Though laws prohibiting Driving Under the Influence
(“DUI”) may be sufficient if law enforcement detects
impairment, studies suggest that more than half of the
occurrences of driving under the influence of cannabis
(“DUIC”) may go undetected by the police.94 In addition,
roadside oral drug testing can be inadequate to detect cur-
rent marijuana impairment and DUIC due to inaccura-
cies.95 Furthermore, most marijuana drug tests measure
inactive metabolites of THC, which only confirms past use
and not current impairment.96 Finally, studies have noted
a greater need for intervention by policy makers to guard
against the risks inherent to DUIC.97 Accordingly, DUI
laws do not adequately address the public safety risks
related to DUIC.
2. Restricting the Transporting of Medical
Marijuana to Ensure Public Safety
While a defendant must be a qualified patient prior to
criminal prosecution in order to invoke CUA protec-
tions,98 the general trend among the cases is that where
the qualified patient possesses less than the general eight
ounce quantity limit, the patient is not subject to criminal
prosecution.  This is consistent with the CUA’s purpose of
not imposing criminal liability,99 but this alone does not
necessitate a finding that transporting is in compliance
with law so as to justify the return of lawfully seized mar-
ijuana after a valid traffic stop or police investigation
involving a motor vehicle.
As the cases demonstrate, law enforcement is often
interacting with qualified patients because of a moving
motor vehicle violation.  Many of these moving motor
vehicle violations may in fact be the result of impaired dri-
ving, but - of course - this is not a given.  Nonetheless,
even to the extent that the moving violation is not actually
caused by a qualified patient’s impaired driving, there
seems to be little reason that they should need to drive and
transport marijuana beyond the time it is initially pro-
cured.
The most logical and probable reason a patient would
be transporting medical marijuana with them while they
are driving is because they need or want to use it.
However, a qualified patient who drives while transport-
ing marijuana, with the exception of its initial procure-
ment, seems indicative of intent to operate a motor vehi-
cle subsequent to using marijuana and, irrespective of
whether such act actually be realized, contemplates a use
of medical marijuana - conduct endangering to others -
that is prohibited by the MMLs and, thus, should fall out-
side of the CUA’s protections.  Courts and the general pub-
lic should be skeptical of this situation since the patient is
“not sitting at home nursing an illness with the medicinal
effects of marijuana[,]”100 but, instead, is quite feasibly a
threat to the safety of other motorists.
In Chavez v. Superior Court,101 the court disallowed the
return of marijuana in the absence of a conviction,102
which is contrary to the Garden Grove outcome.  In Chavez,
the defendant was convicted of selling and transporting
marijuana.103 While awaiting the outcome of his appeal,
he was again arrested for having 4.5 pounds of marijuana
as well as possessing living and drying plants.104 His first
conviction was affirmed, and the prosecutor dismissed the
second case.105 Chavez sought a return of the mari-
juana.106 The issue was whether Chavez, a qualified patient
with physician-authorized use, could seek the return of the
second seizure of marijuana, or at least the general eight
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ounce quantity limit the physician recommendation autho-
rized since there was no conviction resulting from the sec-
ond arrest.107 The Chavez court held that withholding and
destroying the marijuana was proper because, although the
case sub judice did not result in conviction, the amount in
possession was unlawful and the law mandated destruction
of unlawfully possessed marijuana.108 The court denied
the petition to return any of the marijuana.109
The Chavez decision demonstrates that the court will
deny the return of marijuana, even in the absence of a con-
viction, when the patient’s possession does not comply
with the CUA.  The reasoning of the Chavez court should
be equally applicable to automobile transporting situa-
tions where a patient’s possession should be rendered
unlawful because his or her actual or intended use of the
marijuana falls outside of MML protections.  In this
instance, however, the laws permitting the transportation
of marijuana, as construed by the Garden Grove court, are
allowing the unfettered transportation of marijuana by a
qualified patient merely because his or her possession is
below the general quantity guideline limit,110 the effect of
which is to tacitly endorse conduct that endangers others
and creates a risk to public safety.  Like Chavez, where the
qualified patient’s intended or actual use of marijuana is
outside the realm of MML protections, his possession
should be viewed as unlawful and, subsequent to seizure,
should permit forfeiture and destruction.  If possession is
found unlawful, medical marijuana may be destroyed,
even in the absence of a conviction.111
The Garden Grove court distinguished Chavez merely
by finding Kha was in lawful possession while Chavez was
not.112 When read together, these cases indicate that the
factor that is determinative of whether seized marijuana
will be returned to a qualified patient is whether the quan-
tity possessed complies with the general quantity limit so
as to let the court find that the qualified patient was or was
not in lawful possession, which in turn does or does not
justify its return.  Notably, however, Garden Grove is a
motor vehicle case while Chavez is not.  A per se rule
requiring the return of medical marijuana, solely because
possession was below the general quantity limit, ignores
the importance of public policy concerns, namely main-
taining roadway safety and preventing diversions.
The court’s role in construing statutes is to “ascertain the
intent of the legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the
law [and, b]ecause the statutory language is generally the
most reliable indicator of that intent, [courts] look first to
the words [of the statutes
while] giving them their
usual and ordinary mean-
ing.”113 However, the
Garden Grove rule of
required return of medical
marijuana certainly impli-
cates, and perhaps arguably
expressly authorizes, actions
that are inconsistent with the
CUA’s prohibitions on con-
duct that endangers others.
Clearly, the state has the
authority, on matters of
public health or safety, to
exert control over individu-
als when their activities
“begin[] to infringe on the rights and welfare of others,”
and the state need not limit the exercise of its police power
to only those activities with a “present and immediate
impact on public welfare” before it can take action.114 It
is in the exercise of those police powers that public safety
should not only justify restrictions upon the transporting
of medical marijuana but also justify its forfeiture follow-
ing seizure from a motor vehicle.
B. PUBLIC POLICY AS A LIMITATION UPON THE
TRANSPORTING OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
In addition to failing to accord adequate consideration to
public safety risks, the Garden Grove rule requiring the return
of marijuana to a qualified patient when the amount is below
the general quantity limit has significant potential to allow the
unlawful diversion of marijuana for nonmedical uses because
it fails to provide a disincentive for transportation-related CUA
abuses.
In People v. Chakos,115 a sheriff requested a marked police
car to stop the defendant’s car.116 Chakos gave consent to a
search of his car, and the police recovered seven grams of mar-
ijuana, $781 in cash, and a physician’s referral authorizing
marijuana use.117 His apartment was also searched, and police
recovered about 6 ounces of marijuana in several different con-
tainers and a digital scale.118 A closed circuit camera was also
present to allow observations of persons coming to the apart-
ment.119 Chakos was arrested for possession for sale and con-
victed based upon the arresting officer’s expert opinion testi-
mony.120 The issue on appeal was whether the officer’s testi-
mony was legally sufficient to sustain the conviction.121 The
A per se rule 
requiring the 
return of medical 
marijuana . . .
ignores the 
importance of 
public policy 
concerns, namely
maintaining 
roadway safety
and preventing
diversions.
Court Review - Volume 44 115
122. 4 Cal. 3d 231 (1971) (the Hunt court reversed the defendant’s
conviction of possessing methedrine for purpose of sale on the
basis that the narcotics officer’s expert opinion was insufficient to
sustain the conviction since the defendant had a legal prescrip-
tion and the officer did not have sufficient expertise with lawful
use of the drug).
123. Chakos, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 363.
124. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5(b)(2) (Lexis 2008). 
125. Strasburg, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 1060.
126. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 600(a) (Lexis 2008).
127. Id. § 601.
128. Id. § 115.
129. Id. § 605.
130. Id. § 606.
court, applying People v.
Hunt,122 held the officer
lacked qualification as an
expert witness because of
his lack of knowledge and
experience with unlawful
uses of lawfully possessed
substances.123 Since the offi-
cer lacked expert knowledge
to differentiate patterns of
lawful use and unlawful pos-
session for sale, the convic-
tion was reversed.
The Chakos fact pattern
demonstrates a highly suspicious situation where the defen-
dant might have been involved in unlawful drug activity.
However, the Garden Grove rule requiring the return of law-
fully seized marijuana merely because the patient or caregiver
possesses less than the general eight ounce quantity limit has
the effect of thwarting the CUA’s purposes by tacitly sanction-
ing the unlawful diversion of marijuana in contravention to
the CUA’s prohibitions.124
The Garden Grove rule permits a patient or caregiver to use
a motor vehicle for drug distribution activity, raise the CUA as
a defense, and, if successful, have the marijuana returned to
him or her when possession remains below the general eight
ounce quantity limit.  Motor vehicles are often essential to the
illegal transportation and distribution of drugs.  The Strasburg
court observed that the defendant, had his possession been
below the general eight ounce quantity limit, could have
invoked the CUA as a defense.125 Hence, the Garden Grove rule
is unsound, as a matter of public policy, for it not only fails to
provide a disincentive to refrain from diversion-related activi-
ties, but - in fact - promotes abuses of the CUA by returning
unlawfully possessed marijuana to the criminal who success-
fully avoids a conviction merely because possession is below
the general eight ounce quantity limit.
In sum, the public policy of preventing unlawful diversion
warrants a limitation upon the transportation of medical mar-
ijuana.  Subjecting marijuana to forfeiture following lawful
seizure from a motor vehicle furthers this policy by removing
incentives to abuse the CUA.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL PRESUMPTION
Public safety and policy implications should have weighed
more heavily into the Garden Grove decision.  As a matter of
precedent, other courts within California, and perhaps other
states, may concur with the Garden Grove rule.  In such situa-
tions, the prosecution should consider asserting that trans-
porting the marijuana was unlawful because, under the cir-
cumstances, possession is indicative of a use that is an endan-
germent to public safety or diversion-related activities.
In the absence of the courts accepting such an argument, or
a case accepted by the Supreme Court of California on appeal,
corrective measures rest in the hands of the legislature.  To this
end, legislation creating a legal presumption that presumes
medical marijuana is being transported for nonmedical use,
with an exception for the day it is initially procured, is the best
method of addressing safety and policy concerns while afford-
ing qualified patients reasonable medical freedoms the CUA
and other states’ MMLs are intended to provide.
A. A LEGAL PRESUMPTION TO EFFECTUATE PUBLIC
SAFETY AND PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
“A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law
requires to be made from another fact or facts found or . . .
established in the action.”126 California recognizes two types
of rebuttable presumptions, those affecting the burden of pro-
ducing evidence, and those affecting the burden of proof127
(i.e., persuasion).128 A presumption that affects the burden of
proof is intended to “implement some public policy, other than
to facilitate the determination of the particular action,”129 and
“impose[s] upon the party against whom it operates the bur-
den of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact.”130
1. Rationale and Considerations Respecting the
Presumption
A limitation upon the transporting of medical mari-
juana to implement public safety and public policy con-
cerns should strike a balance between furthering the pol-
icy objectives while avoiding any significant erosion to the
CUA’s legal protections.
The rationale underlying the presumption is ensuring
public safety upon the roadways and preventing the diver-
sion of medical marijuana for nonmedical purposes,
including illegal use in addition to illegal sale.  These
objectives are furthered by limiting the transporting of
medical marijuana within motor vehicles, with the excep-
tion of initial procurement, to further policy objectives
because the unnecessary transporting of marijuana indi-
cates unlawful use, namely, conduct that endangers others
through a willingness to drive after use or, alternatively,
diversion for nonmedical purposes.  Permitting forfeiture,
as a civil penalty, prevents the return of medical marijuana
that is presumed to be transported for an impermissible
nonmedical purpose and imposes a consequence for non-
essential transporting.
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2. The Proposed Presumption
This proposed presumption would implement the pub-
lic policies of 1) ensuring motorist safety upon roadways
and 2) deterring the unlawful diversion of medical mari-
juana through transporting.  The proposed presumption
would shift the burden of proof to the qualified patient or
primary caregiver who seeks to avoid the presumption’s
effect and would provide:
Any qualified patient or primary caregiver who,
while having a motor vehicle under his or her direct
and immediate control, is found to possess medical
marijuana after a valid traffic stop or police investi-
gation involving a motor vehicle, is presumed to
possess the medical marijuana for nonmedical pur-
poses.  This presumption shall not apply to any qual-
ified patient or primary caregiver who demonstrates
that the medical marijuana in his or her possession
was obtained within the same calendar day on which
the traffic stop or police investigation involving the
motor vehicle occurred, nor shall this presumption
apply to any criminal proceeding or action, or any
civil suit where the qualified patient or primary care-
giver is a defendant or real party in interest.
The presumption, by presuming possession is for a non-
medical purpose, permits law enforcement to achieve its
goal of effectuating forfeiture to deal with the unique and
problematic issues surrounding medical marijuana in the
context of motor vehicles while preserving state policy of
not subjecting qualified patients or primary caregivers to
criminal penalty.  Since transporting is presumed to be for
a nonmedical purpose and outside of the CUA and MMPA
protections, forfeiture is permitted under California law.131
a. Direct and Immediate Control of a Motor Vehicle
In order for the presumption to apply, the patient or
caregiver must be in possession of medical marijuana
while having a motor vehicle under his or her direct and
immediate control.  The conjunctive “direct and immedi-
ate control” element requires a sufficient nexus between
the patient or caregiver and the motor vehicle for the pre-
sumption to apply.
i. Immediate Control
The “immediate control” requirement ensures there is
a spatial proximity between the patient or caregiver and
the motor vehicle.  Mere investigation regarding medical
marijuana within a motor vehicle that the patient or care-
giver owns will not trigger application of the presumption.
Rather, the immediate control requirement ensures that,
for the presumption to apply, the patient or caregiver must
be within or so close by the vehicle to render his or her
control of the vehicle immediate.
ii. Direct Control
The “direct control”
requirement limits the pre-
sumption’s applicability
even further by ensuring
the limitation upon trans-
porting marijuana is con-
fined to a patient or care-
giver who is or will be dri-
ving.  The patient or care-
giver need not be actually
driving but must have
direct control.  As such,
the presumption would not apply to a patient or caregiver
who is merely a passenger within a vehicle because he or
she is not in direct control of the vehicle; thus, the pre-
sumption and the limitation upon transporting are inap-
plicable.  However, if the patient or caregiver is not driving
but has direct control over the vehicle, where - for exam-
ple - circumstances indicate the patient or caregiver is dri-
ving or will be driving because he or she is or will be the
vehicle’s sole occupant, the presumption and the limita-
tion upon transporting would apply.
Essentially, the “direct and immediate control” require-
ment is broad enough to limit transporting in those situa-
tions where the patient or caregiver is or will be driving,
while not limiting situations where the patient or care-
giver is merely transporting medical marijuana as a non-
driving passenger.  However, as will be discussed, merely
avoiding the application of the presumption, as a non-dri-
ving passenger, does not mean that an individual will suc-
ceed in his or her attempt to transport marijuana for non-
medical purposes.
b. Exception for Same-Day Procurement
The presumption affords a reasonable means of trans-
porting marijuana by a driving patient or caregiver on the
day of initial procurement.  This must be so since, in the
absence of allowing at least some opportunity for trans-
porting marijuana, a patient or caregiver would have no
means of otherwise getting it home to make use of it.  The
courts have rejected the notion that patients should have
a broad right to use or transport marijuana without hin-
drance or inconvenience.132 By precluding the presump-
tion’s operation upon an affirmative showing that the mar-
ijuana was procured on the day of a valid traffic stop or
police investigation involving their motor vehicle, the
patient or caregiver is afforded a window of reasonable
time to transport the marijuana home without subjecting
it to forfeiture subsequent to seizure by law enforcement.
This presumption merely curtails the unrestrained trans-
portation of marijuana to that reasonably necessary to
ensure transportation is limited to medical uses while dis-
suading conduct that endangers others or is an unlawful
diversion.
131. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11473.5(a) (Lexis 2007). 132. Ross, 42 Cal. 4th at 928; Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 1547 n.8.
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135. Such were the circumstances in Chakos, Garden Grove, Trippet,
Wright, and Young, all of which involved a driver who had direct
and immediate control of the motor vehicle.  Notably, Strasburg
is a case involving more than one occupant in the vehicle, but
Strasburg would still be covered by the proposed presumption
since he had direct and immediate control of the vehicle.
c. No Criminal Liability or
Civil Liability in Suits Based
upon In Personam Jurisdiction
The final exception to the
presumption’s applicability
ensures that it is broad enough
to permit the forfeiture of med-
ical marijuana that is trans-
ported unnecessarily while
avoiding the imposition of
criminal or civil liability upon
the patient or caregiver.
i. No Criminal Liability or Sanction
Notably, the CUA, as expanded by the MMPA, pre-
cludes criminal liability for marijuana-related offenses,
including transporting marijuana, solely on the basis of
the qualified patient or primary caregiver’s status.133
The proposed presumption is intended to allow city
and county prosecutors the ability to invoke the presump-
tion to cause a forfeiture of medical marijuana that was
being transported at sometime other than the day it was
initially procured, presumably for a nonmedical purpose.
Hypothetically, the prosecutor could, by invoking the pre-
sumption, first assert possession was unlawful and then
conceivably pursue criminal charges predicated upon the
presumed fact that possession was for an unlawful non-
medical purpose.
However, the presumption, by way of its exception, is
inapplicable to a criminal proceeding or action.  Thus, the
preclusion of the presumption’s operation in any criminal
proceeding ensures that the prosecutor may not piggy-
back a marijuana-related conviction upon the presump-
tion’s effect that the qualified patient or primary caregiver
is not in lawful possession.  Put another way, the pre-
sumption’s exception - in accordance with the CUA’s guar-
antees - prevents the prosecutor from backdooring a crim-
inal charge or conviction after invoking the presumption
of nonmedical use.  In those instances where possession is
presumed unlawful because the patient or caregiver is
unable to affirmatively show same-day procurement, the
marijuana is subject to forfeiture and destruction, but the
patient or caregiver avoids any criminal liability on the
basis of transporting a quantity below the general eight
ounce limit because the presumption has no effect in any
criminal prosecution.  This ensures, in accordance with
the CUA and MMPA, that the qualified patient or primary
caregiver is not subject to criminal liability or sanction on
the sole basis of their status as a patient or caregiver.
ii. No Liability in Civil Suits Based upon In
Personam Jurisdiction
Finally, the presumption is inapplicable to a civil suit
where a patient or caregiver is a defendant or real party in
interest.  This ensures that if a patient or caregiver is sued
in relation to a car accident, or is a real party in interest
with respect to a claim against their insurance carrier, the
presumption is inapplicable and the suing plaintiff must
bear the usual burdens of production and persuasion with
respect to causation in the civil suit.  This prevents a
plaintiff from conceivably initiating a civil suit, after a
motor vehicle investigation and/or citation stemming
from an auto accident involving the patient or caregiver,
and asserting the presumption of nonmedical use as a
basis of liability with respect to causation in the auto acci-
dent.  In effect, the presumption allows a forfeiture of the
marijuana without shifting usual burdens of proof in a
civil suit based upon in personam jurisdiction, which
might be initiated after an auto accident involving a qual-
ified patient or primary caregiver where his or her fault
may be at issue.
iii. Presumption Does Apply to In Rem Proceedings
Notably, the presumption should not be inapplicable to
all civil proceedings per se and this is why only in per-
sonam civil actions are excluded.  “A forfeiture proceeding
is a civil in rem action in which property is considered the
defendant, on the fiction that the property is the guilty
party.”134 Because hearings or proceedings related to the
disposition of marijuana will be required, the presump-
tion’s applicability is preserved for those hearings or pro-
ceedings in which the court’s jurisdiction is in rem with
respect to the marijuana that is to be forfeited under the
presumption of nonmedical use.
3. Evading the Presumption’s Applicability Will
Not Result in Escaping Scrutiny
The proposed presumption creates a bright-line test for
transporting marijuana and presumes possession is for
nonmedical use under certain circumstances and therefore
unlawful.  Though a person could attempt to bypass an
invocation of the presumption by transporting marijuana
as a non-driving passenger in possession, merely avoiding
application of the presumption does not necessarily mean
that an individual will always succeed in his or her
attempt to violate MMLs.
First, it is noteworthy to mention that most motor vehi-
cle cases involving medical marijuana have been situa-
tions where the driver was the sole occupant of the vehi-
cle.135 This may even be more likely where there is delib-
erate intent to circumvent drug laws under cover of med-
ical marijuana’s statutory protections since, presumably,
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136. While identification cardholders are immune from arrest when
possession is under the general quantity limit, a law-enforcement
officer is not required to accept the identification card as valid if
he or she “has reasonable cause to believe that the information
contained in the card is false or fraudulent, or the card is being
used fraudulently.”  Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.78
(Lexis 2007) (emphasis added).  Thus, attempting to divert mar-
ijuana may still result in arrest.
137. Notably, neither the CUA nor the MMPA afford exemption from
criminal conspiracy, thus, a qualified patient or primary caregiver
- even if registered under the MMPA identification program -
would not be immune from arrest on such a charge, but such
arrests would of course need to be sustainable with probable
cause.
138. Such a legal presumption could likely work in all motor vehicle
scenarios with respect to those states having MMLs or decisional
case law that mandates the return of medical marijuana.
139. Of course a person could refute the underlying fact from which
the presumed fact of “nonmedical use” ensues, but the underly-
ing fact—a valid traffic stop or police investigation involving a
motor vehicle—is not likely to be a disputed issue in the major-
ity of circumstances and, therefore, does not warrant discussion
more than casual mentioning.
the criminal will want to go undetected.  However, with
the exception of same-day procurement, lawful transport
under the proposed presumption would require the assis-
tance of another person to drive the patient or caregiver
who would be the non-driving passenger in possession.
Second, because deliberate attempts to violate MMLs
will require the assistance of a driver to accompany the
non-driving passenger in possession, there is a greater
likelihood of detecting unlawful transporting.  Specifically,
the complicity involved in the criminal enterprise, by
increasing the number of participants, gives rise to a
greater likelihood of detection.
Law enforcement encountering a driver with a non-dri-
ving passenger in possession can undertake heightened
scrutiny of their activities incidental to a vehicle stop or
motor vehicle investigation.  Inquiry can be made into the
surrounding circumstances of the possession, including:
where the driver and passenger are coming from, where
they are going to, and for what purposes. Where circum-
stances warrant, law enforcement can undertake immedi-
ate separation of the driver and passenger for isolated
questioning to assess the truthfulness and consistencies,
or lack thereof, regarding their activities.  If there appears
no discernable reason for transporting the marijuana, the
absence - for example - of a planned out of town trip or
overnight stay away from home, this will alert law enforce-
ment of the possibility that transporting is for unlawful
nonmedical use.
Third, as a consequence and at the very minimum, law
enforcement is alerted to potential criminal activity that
can be further investigated by undercover officers.
Alternatively, though the conduct falls outside of the
scope of the presumption, where law enforcement con-
cludes that the driver and passenger are engaged in unlaw-
ful transporting for nonmedical uses such as diversion for
sale, the non-driving passenger in possession is still sub-
ject to the usual rules of law where they can be arrested,
upon probable cause that a violation is occurring or has
occurred, and required to assert the CUA as their affirma-
tive defense.136 Finally, for the most severe and egregious
situations where the evidence and circumstances demon-
strate a strong inference of illegal activity, the police can
arrest the driver and the non-driving passenger in posses-
sion so the prosecutor may pursue conspiracy charges,
which also serves as a deterrent and punishment for indi-
viduals who would agree to be a driver in the transporting
of marijuana for nonmed-
ical uses.137
In sum, the proposed
statutory presumption,
while permitting a driver
to transport on the same-
day of procurement,
deters the transporting of
medical marijuana for
nonmedical purposes as a
means of ensuring public
safety and addressing
public policy concerns.
This is accomplished by allowing the forfeiture and
destruction of marijuana that was lawfully seized from a
driver subsequent to a valid traffic stop or police investi-
gation involving the patient or caregiver’s motor vehicle,
which - as a practical matter - is when it is most likely to
be encountered by law enforcement.  A patient or care-
giver could avoid operation of the presumption by not
transporting marijuana after the day it is initially pro-
cured.  If transporting medical marijuana is required after
the day it is initially procured, the patient could simply get
someone to drive them.  The presumption affords a lim-
ited yet reasonable allowance for transporting upon an
affirmative showing of same-day procurement.
B. THE PRESUMPTION AND FORFEITURE ARE
CONGRUENT WITH CALIFORNIA LAW
The presumption and any resulting forfeitures, which
reverse the operation of the Garden Grove rule in the motor
vehicle context, are consistent with many facets of California
law.138
1. Requiring Proof of Lawful Transport is in
Accord with Affirmative Defenses
The presumption imposes upon the qualified patient or
caregiver the burden of production and persuasion that
the marijuana was being transported in accordance with
the presumption’s exception for same-day procurement.139
This burden upon the patient or caregiver parallels the
burden of invoking the CUA as an affirmative defense to a
prosecution.  Since the burden of showing lawful trans-
port does nothing more than allocate to the qualified
patient or primary caregiver a burden similar to that
imposed if he or she were seeking protections of the CUA,
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patient or primary caregiver from possessing mar-
ijuana in a place open to the general public if the
possession is limited to that necessary to transport
the marijuana directly to the patient or primary
caregiver or directly to a place where the patient or
primary caregiver may lawfully possess or use the
marijuana[.]142
However, in contrast, the proposed presumption imple-
ments this “necessity of transporting” limitation for the
sake of public safety and policy, while additionally curtail-
ing illegal diversions and drug profiteering.
In Urziceanu, the defendant admitted at trial that he
“would sometimes buy marijuana on the black market by
the pound to supply the [qualified patients].”143 The
Urziceanu case demonstrates that persons who supply
marijuana to qualified patients or primary caregivers may
be acting in an illegal manner.  Worse, there may be
instances where there is no colorable compliance with
MMLs and suppliers are - in fact - drug dealers who are
unlawfully profiteering on the sale of marijuana to
patients and caregivers.
Requiring proof of same-day procurement, as a practi-
cal matter, also requires proof of the source of the mari-
juana.  Empty assertions of same-day procurement are
unlikely to carry the patient’s burden of proof without also
demonstrating or documenting where the marijuana was
obtained.  While the Garden Grove court was correct that,
under the CUA and MMPA, the source of the marijuana
need not be shown to invoke MML protections,144 requir-
ing proof of same-day procurement: 1) encourages the
user to purchase medical marijuana from legitimate dis-
pensaries or cooperatives; 2) favors record-keeping of
medical marijuana-related transactions; 3) requires disclo-
sure of the source and time of procurement of the seized
medical marijuana; and 4) deters profiteering on the
unlawful drug dealing in marijuana since patients and
caregivers will have an incentive to purchase their mari-
juana from authorized sources to ensure its return in the
event of a seizure.
A patient seeking to prove same-day procurement has a
few options.  First, the patient can obtain medical mari-
juana from an authorized source thereby enabling him to
prove same-day procurement if and when necessary.
Second, the patient could provide evidence of procure-
ment from an unauthorized source, which would allow
law enforcement to discover illegal drug dealing in mari-
juana.  Third, the patient may fail or can refuse to prove
same-day procurement of the marijuana, thereby subject-
ing it to forfeiture.
Furthermore, forfeiture of marijuana that is obtained
from a drug dealer is wholly consistent with the purposes
of the forfeiture statutes.  “[C]ivil forfeiture is intended to
the burden-shifting approach is
consistent with the affirmative
defense approach taken by the
MML statutes.
In addition, the presumption
creates a bright-line test for
establishing lawful transport of
medical marijuana.  The Garden
Grove court did not apply or even
acknowledge the Trippet test in
assessing the lawfulness of Kha’s
transportation of medical mari-
juana, despite the fact that the Supreme Court of
California indirectly endorsed it when the Wright case
went up on appeal from the same court issuing the Garden
Grove decision.140 In any event, the presumption provides
a clearly defined standard that readily allows for a deter-
mination of when marijuana should be seized and for its
subsequent disposition without adhering to a rigid rule of
required return as found in the Garden Grove decision, or
a potentially ambiguous factors test as found in the Trippet
test.
Finally, by shifting the burden of proof upon the patient
or caregiver to show that transport is lawful, the People
and the State avoid the problems embodied within the
Hunt decision.  In particular, when the People carry the
burden of showing that an otherwise lawfully possessed
drug, in this case medical marijuana, is being possessed
unlawfully, as when the patient or caregiver is unlawfully
transporting marijuana for nonmedical uses, there arises a
problematic situation that the officer’s testimony may suf-
fer from the infirmity of insufficiency if the court finds
that his or her knowledge or experience is lacking with
respect to the illegal uses of legal drugs, namely medical
marijuana.141 In this regard, by placing the burden of
proof upon the patient or caregiver, any problem regard-
ing the expert qualifications of a testifying officer are alto-
gether avoided.
2. Proof of Lawful Transport Deters Unlawful
Profiteering on Medical Marijuana
Only Alaska has imposed a restriction upon when med-
ical marijuana may be transported, but Alaska’s statute,
unlike the proposed presumption, provides no means -
aside from the driver’s own assertions - that will allow law
enforcement a way to discern whether the transporting of
medical marijuana is “necessary” or is prohibited because
it is unnecessary.  In particular, Alaska law provides:
A patient, primary caregiver, or alternate care-
giver may not engage in the medical use of mari-
juana in plain view of, or in a place open to, the
general public; this paragraph does not prohibit a
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be remedial by removing the
tools and profits from those
engaged in the illicit drug
trade,”145 with law enforcement
being the principal objective.146
While a patient or caregiver may
be authorized to obtain and use
medical marijuana, marijuana
that was illegally sold by and
procured from a drug dealer
should not lose its status as an
illegal transaction merely
because the patient or caregiver
is authorized to possess it.  To
the contrary, “[a]ll controlled
substances which have been manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, or acquired in violation of [the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act]” are subject to forfeiture.147
Ultimately, forfeiture aids in bifurcating lawful medical
marijuana acquisitions from unlawful drug sales thereby
curtailing the profiteering upon illegal marijuana sales
made to qualified patients and their primary caregivers.
3. Forfeiture Does Not Subject a Patient or
Caregiver to Criminal Liability
As already noted, the CUA precludes criminal liability
of a qualified patient or primary caregiver solely on the
basis of their status,148 but forfeitures are not criminal
sanctions.
In People v. Shanndoah,149 the people appealed a trial
court order dismissing criminal drug charges against the
defendant.150 The trial court dismissed the criminal
charges because the state had previously initiated forfei-
ture proceedings with respect to drug-related money.151
The trial court found that the forfeiture was punitive in
relation to the drug offenses; thus, double jeopardy had
attached and required dismissal of the criminal charges.152
The issue before the Shanndoah court was whether the
monetary forfeiture was a criminal sanction that required
dismissal of subsequent criminal charges that also related
to the drug offenses that gave rise to the forfeiture in the
first instance.153 The court held that forfeitures under the
Health and Safety Code are civil in nature.154 The court
reasoned that “forfeiture prescribed by the Health and
Safety Code is in rem—that is, it is an action against the
property itself [and is] distinct from a criminal proceeding
which is in personam.”155 The trial court’s dismissal of the
criminal charges was reversed.156
Because forfeitures of property under the Health and
Safety Code provisions are deemed civil sanctions, forfei-
tures do not violate the CUA’s prohibitions on criminal lia-
bility.  Accordingly, the forfeiture of medical marijuana
exacts a civil penalty that is directly proportional to the
amount of marijuana unlawfully transported.
Furthermore, even if construed as a criminal sanction,
which it is not, the CUA only prohibits liability for crimi-
nal transportation on the sole basis of a person’s status as
a qualified patient or primary caregiver.157 Forfeiture,
however, only comes into play after medical marijuana is
seized subsequent to a valid traffic stop or a police inves-
tigation involving the motor vehicle, both of which are
based upon probable cause.  Thus, forfeiture is not based
solely on a patient or caregiver’s status but is the conse-
quential result of a seizure stemming from a moving vio-
lation or a police investigation involving the patient or
caregiver’s motor vehicle.
4. Forfeiture Implements Important Policies
Without Overburdening Patients’ Rights
In the context of seizures of medical marijuana from
motor vehicles, a presumption that causes forfeiture
strikes a balance between implementing policies without
overburdening patient rights or needs.
Forfeiture, subsequent to a valid traffic stop or police
investigation involving a motor vehicle, occurs when the
patient or caregiver fails to demonstrate to the court that
transporting occurred on the day of initial procurement.
Forfeiture results for transporting that risks an endanger-
ment to the safety of others and, thus, falls outside of the
CUA’s protections while avoiding significant inconve-
nience or hindrance to the qualified patient who may still
obtain and use marijuana in accordance with the CUA’s
contemplated purposes and protections.  In the end,
endangering conduct and diversion are both unprotected
under the CUA and MMPA, therefore, forfeiture is justi-
fied if the patient or caregiver cannot demonstrate same-
day procurement.
Alternative means, in lieu of a legal presumption that
allows for forfeiture, are inadequate for implementing pol-
icy concerns.  The law could limit how marijuana is trans-
ported.  For example, the transporting of medical mari-
juana might be confined to the trunk of the vehicle or in
a locked container, the later being the case in Vermont,158
but these restrictions are ineffective because, while they
may prevent the use of marijuana while driving, they have
no effect upon driving subsequent to use or upon pre-
venting diversion.
Alternatively, the general quantity limits could be
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reduced, but this may have the effect of not allowing a suf-
ficient quantity of marijuana to treat the illnesses of law-
abiding patients who are not abusing MMLs.  In addition,
a reduction to the general quantity limits unduly burdens
legitimate patients’ rights by restricting possession in situ-
ations beyond the motor vehicle context and without a
direct correlation to the public safety and policy concerns
involving motor vehicles.  In this regard, the presumption
is tailored to implement policies related to specific con-
cerns involving the transporting of medical marijuana
within motor vehicles without overburdening the rights of
patients who are otherwise in compliance with MMLs.
In sum, forfeiture allows local law enforcement and the
state the ability to ensure patients and caregivers are not
abusing MMLs through endangering conduct or diver-
sions while the patient or caregiver’s legitimate need to
transport marijuana remains intact.
C. THE PRESUMPTION IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
To the extent that the proposed statutory presumption is
subjected to constitutional challenge, it is likely to be upheld.
The most probable constitutional challenges, if any, are likely
to be an alleged unconstitutional amendment to the CUA or a
denial of due process.
1. The Issue of Unconstitutional Amendments to
the CUA
Since the Garden Grove decision, there have been cases
addressing the issue of whether the legislatively enacted
MMPA was an unconstitutional amendment to the
CUA.159
In Co. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML,160 San Diego
and San Bernardino counties (collectively “Counties”)
contested the MMPA’s requirement that they implement
and administer the identification card system related to
qualified patients and primary caregivers.161 The issue was
whether the MMPA was preempted by the federal CSA on
the grounds of conflict preemption and obstacle preemp-
tion162 and whether the MMPA’s mandate requiring imple-
mentation of an identification card system was an uncon-
stitutional amendment to the CUA.163 The court held the
Counties’ standing was limited to challenging only those
MMPA provisions requiring implementation of the ID card
program164 and that both
conflict preemption and
obstacle preemption were
unfounded.165 The court
also held that the MMPA
did not amend the
CUA.166 The court rea-
soned that the CSA is
silent on issuance of ID
cards, thus, there could be
no positive conflict.167
Furthermore, issuance of
ID cards was not a “signif-
icant” obstacle to CSA
objectives; thus, obstacle
preemption was inapplica-
ble.168 As to the amendment issue, the court reasoned the
MMPA did not add to the CUA as it was a separate legisla-
tive scheme, CUA protections remained intact, and the ID
card system did not impact the CUA’s protections.169 The
judgment was affirmed.170
Conversely, in People v. Kelly,171 which was decided
before San Diego NORML, the court struck down a MMPA
provision as an unconstitutional amendment.172 In Kelly,
the defendant was a qualified patient who was convicted
for the sale and cultivation of marijuana subsequent to
police seizure of 12 ounces of marijuana in addition to liv-
ing plants.173 The issue was whether the MMPA’s general
eight ounce limitation upon the possession of medical
marijuana, as a legislative enactment, unconstitutionally
amended the CUA thereby rendering it prejudicial error
for the prosecutor to argue that the defendant could be
convicted for possessing more than eight ounces without
a special physician’s prescription.174 The court held that
the general quantity limits within the MMPA were an
unconstitutional amendment to the CUA; thus, the prose-
cutor’s argument in support of the defendant’s conviction
was improper.175 The court reasoned that the only limita-
tion imposed upon possession of medical marijuana under
the CUA was that possession be reasonably related to the
patient’s medical needs, and because the MMPA added
general quantity limitations upon possession, it modified
the CUA and was an unconstitutional amendment.176 The
court struck down the general quantity limitations con-
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tained in the MMPA177 and
reversed the conviction.178
Currently, the Kelly case is
under review before the
California Supreme Court
with the issues limited to
whether the general quantity
limits unconstitutionally
amend the CUA and if there were alternatives to invalida-
tion.179 As the Kelly appellate court noted, “Legislative
acts, such as the MMP, are entitled to a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality[,]”180 but the appellate court’s
opinion is devoid of any attempt to interpret the general
quantity limits with the CUA so that the two may peace-
ably coexist.  Since “[a]n interpretation which gives effect
is preferred to one which makes void[,]”181 the court was
obligated to attempt to reconcile the laws before severing
the purportedly offending law.
Though Kelly could be overturned on the basis of fail-
ing to adhere to the maxims of jurisprudence, the reason-
ing of the San Diego NORML court that the MMPA did not
amend the CUA is equally applicable to the general quan-
tity limitations provision.  The general quantity limitations
at issue in Kelly, like the ID card system at issue in San
Diego NORML, did not add to the CUA as the MMPA is a
separate legislative scheme.  Further, the CUA protections
remain intact, and the general quantity limitation does not
impact the CUA’s protections, as will be explained.
The Kelly court relied on Cal. Lab. Fed’n. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Stand. Bd.182 for the proposition that the
general quantity limitations in the MMPA amounted to an
amendment of the CUA, but Cal. Lab. is distinguishable.  If
the MMPA imposed an absolute cap upon quantity limits,
as did the Budget Act with respect to the attorney fees at
issue in Cal. Lab.,183 then the MMPA’s general quantity
limit would be amendatory.  However, the MMPA did not
impose an absolute limit upon the amount of marijuana
that may be possessed since a patient or caregiver, with a
doctor’s recommendation, “may possess an amount of mar-
ijuana [that is] consistent with the patient’s needs.”184
Accordingly, the general quantity limits specified in the
MMPA, as distinguished from the absolute cap limit
imposed on attorney fees in Cal. Lab., are more akin to a
general guideline as to what a reasonable quantity shall be
for the treatment of illnesses.  Since the general quantity
limit guideline - when read as a whole with other provi-
sions in the MMPA - does not place any absolute limit
upon the amount of marijuana that a patient may possess
or grow, the MMPA’s general quantity limit guideline does
not impact the CUA’s protections since those protections
remain intact.  Specifically, patients may possess and grow
an amount of marijuana that is reasonably necessary for
their condition, even when that amount exceeds the gen-
eral quantity limit guideline.
While a physician’s recommendation is required for
marijuana in excess of the general quantity limit,185 a
physician’s recommendation is also needed for medical
marijuana below the general quantity limit.186 Thus, the
requirement of a physician recommendation designating a
specific amount of medical marijuana that is needed for a
patient’s condition, which exceeds the general quantity
limits, is no more onerous than the requirement that they
seek a recommendation to become a qualified patient in
the first instance.  Accordingly, the MMPA’s general quan-
tity limit neither withdraws protections nor adds obstacles
to a patient’s right to obtain sufficient quantities of mari-
juana for his or her illness; thus, the MMPA did not amend
the CUA.
Finally, “[i]nterpretation must be reasonable,”187 and
the law disfavors constructions that lead to absurd results.
However, severing the general quantity limit from the
MMPA severely impairs an important objective of the CUA
and MMPA by removing the only measurable standard by
which lawful conduct can be ascertained.  The net effect
for non-cardholding qualified patients and primary care-
givers, who are not immune from arrest, is that the judge
or jury must decide whether the amount of marijuana they
possessed was reasonable for their medical condition, after
arrest and prosecution.  Because people will differ in their
own beliefs as to what is reasonable, severing the general
quantity limit brings uncertainty to the law.  Thus, patients
and caregivers may be placed in the compromising posi-
tion that a conviction may ultimately result if, despite their
legitimate need, the amount of marijuana they possess is
found to be unreasonable.  Additionally, the effect upon
cardholding patients is that they, in the absence of evidence
of criminal conduct, may possess excessively large quanti-
ties of marijuana while enjoying immunity from arrest and
prosecution.  When factoring in the current lack of restric-
tions upon transporting and the Garden Grove rule of
required return, we are left with a potentially disastrous set
of laws that seem to favor  illegal drug trafficking.  Severing
the general quantity limit from the MMPA leads to unrea-
sonable and absurd results.
2. The Presumption Within the Framework of an
Amendment to the CUA
The proposed presumption’s limitation upon transport-
ing is incapable of amending the CUA.  Since the MMPA
was a legislative enactment that extended protection from
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criminal prosecution to the crime of transporting,188
which was a punishable offense under the CUA standing
in isolation,189 any limitation upon the unfettered right to
transport medical marijuana is merely a limitation upon a
legislatively granted immunity and cannot be an abroga-
tion of a right granted by voter initiative under the CUA.
Indeed, under the CUA, no such right existed.  As such,
the proposed presumption’s limitation upon transporting
cannot be an amendment to the CUA because the CUA
afforded no right of qualified immunity from prosecution
for transporting.
3. The Presumption Affords Due Process of Law
The Garden Grove court, relying on People v. Lamonte,190
found that the police could not retain Kha’s medical mar-
ijuana without running afoul of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.191 The presumption, how-
ever, satisfies the due process standards articulated in
Lamonte.
In Lamonte, the defendant was arrested after trying to
use fabricated credit cards in a restaurant.192 The police
recovered many items from the defendant’s car including
numerous credit cards, false identification cards, laminat-
ing equipment, various telephone and computer equip-
ment, and a shotgun.193 Lamonte negotiated a guilty plea
to the charges of felon in possession of a firearm and bur-
glary and then sought return of all property, except the
weapons.194 The motion was opposed by the state.195 The
issue was whether the state could withhold property on
the basis that the property items were instrumentalities of
crime.196 The court held that the defendant’s property was
not contraband and must be returned to him.197 The court
reasoned that only contraband was excepted from return
and merely using a lawful item in the commission of a
crime does not make it contraband.198 The court directed
the property to be returned.
“Contraband is goods or merchandise whose importa-
tion, exportation, or possession is forbidden.”199 Since the
presumption presumes that possession of marijuana
within a vehicle is for nonmedical use and unlawful, the
reasoning of the Lamonte court would permit forfeiture
subsequent to a lawful seizure.  The marijuana that is pre-
sumed for nonmedical use is unlawful contraband and, as
the Lamonte court noted that contraband does not need to
be returned,200 the marijuana seized - applying Lamonte -
would not need to be returned.
Second, as the Lamonte court appropriately noted, “[t]he
confiscation and destruction of property without a hearing,
proceeding or other forum to determine whether the prop-
erty was dangerous, illegal to possess or otherwise excepted
from return to the owner is an unconstitutional deprivation
of property without due process of law.”201 However, the
presumption affords the patient or caregiver an opportunity,
through judicial process, to assert that the presumption is
inapplicable because the marijuana was procured on the
same day in which the traffic stop or motor vehicle investi-
gation occurred.  Thus, because the patient or caregiver
would be afforded a hearing to determine the legal or illegal
character of the seized marijuana, the operation of the pre-
sumption satisfies due process of law.
Ultimately, the presumption’s operation, with respect to
qualified patients and primary caregivers who transport
marijuana in motor vehicles, is likely to be upheld as con-
stitutional because it does not amend the CUA, nor does
it offend due process of law.
CONCLUSION
Medical marijuana laws are intended to afford suffering or
ill patients a means of relief that conventional prescription
medications are unable to provide.  However, there are well-
documented abuses of medical marijuana laws by persons who
would attempt to subvert their intended purposes while invok-
ing the protections the statutes afford.  In this regard, the non-
essential transporting of marijuana by a qualified patient or
primary caregiver who is driving should be viewed as conduct
that indicates an intent to use or possess marijuana in a way
that is not contemplated under MMLs - namely engaging in
conduct that endangers others and/or unlawful diversions for
nonmedical use - and, thus, should be viewed as outside MML
protections.  In those states adhering to a rule requiring the
return of lawfully seized medical marijuana, a legal presump-
tion that effectuates a forfeiture of marijuana that is legally
seized subsequent to a valid traffic stop or motor vehicle inves-
tigation may be a viable means of implementing public safety
and public policy concerns related to highway safety and drug
enforcement efforts.
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